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Summary findings
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of private flows, multilateral lending has played an  borrowing countries.
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1. Introduction
Besides transferring funds when countries do not have access to private capital, lending
from multilateral development  banks (MDBs) is supposed to contribute to building infrastructure,
institutions and public policy in developing countries.'  The not-for-profit and multilateral nature
of these lending institutions has some distinct advantages in comparison to private lenders and
bilateral agencies: these agencies have access to a wealth of information on developing countries
that can be useful for investors undertaking new investments in a developing country; they also
provide a unique forum for international policy coordination, and if necessary, for designing and
exercising policy conditionalities in a borrower country. It is expected, therefore, that multilateral
lending should encourage private flows to developing countries.
Some authors have found empirical support for this view. 2 For example, Kharas and
Shishido (1991)  found  that  during  1974-85, by  alleviating credit  rationing  and  improving
creditworthiness (by  increasing international reserves, for  example), official aid  was able to
generate spillover effects that attracted private flows. A recent study of aid-recipient countries in
Africa estimated that in countries with good  economic management, one percent  of GDP  in
foreign aid  increased private investment an  extra  1.9 percent of GDP  by improving investor
' Througliout  this  paper, a distinction  is made  between  loans  from MDBs,  and flows from the IMF. Thus,
multilateral  flows  refer to loans from MDBs (including  the World  Bank and regional  development  banks)
to developing  countries  as defined  in World  Bank's Global  Development  Finance  reports.
2 See  among  others  Checki  and Stern (2000),  Krueger  (1999),  Rodrik  (1995),  Kharas  and Shishido  (1991),
Alesina  and  Dollar  (1998),  Summers  (1999),  Bird  and Rowlands  (1997).
2confidence and public services such as education and infrastructure (World Bank  1998 p  40,
Dollar and Easterly  1998). These authors also found that a  I  percent of GDP  in aid reduced
private  investment by  0.5  percent  in  developing countries  with  poor  policies.  Since the
relationship between domestic private investment rate and private capital flows from abroad to a
developing country is likely to be positive, this finding implies some degree of crowding-out of
private flows by multilateral flows in poor-management countries.
Several studies, on the other hand, did not find any evidence that multilateral lending
encouraged private flows.  Rodrik (1995) found that the relationship between private flows and
lagged multilateral lending was negative (though not significant) during 1970-93. He also found
that  multilateral flows-especially  IMF  flows-tended  to  follow  private  flows,  raising  the
possibility of "bailing-out" of private investors, as also argued by  Dooley (1994) and Killick
(1995a).  (Somewhat surprisingly, and consistent with the  results reported later, Rodrik also
found that some multilateral flows, especially the non-concessional flows from IBRD, tended to
improve  the growth potential of the recipient country.)
Dasgupta and  Ratha  (2000) noted that the  decline  in the  World Bank's  (long-term)
investment lending in recent years was due to the increase in private foreign direct investment
(project finance in  particular),  whereas  its  (relatively shorter-term)  adjustment  lending was
strongly counter-cyclical with respect to private non-FDI flows. They argued that such negative
relationship was a  reflection of a passive "stabilizing" role played by multilateral agencies in
response to volatile private flows:  the demand for official flows declined when private flows
became available, and  increased when private investors withdrew, especially  during financial
crises.
Lernick (1999), in a background paper prepared for the Meltzer Commission Report on
International Financial Institutions, argued that multilateral flows were replacing private flows,
especially in emerging market economies.
3Some authors  have  pointed  out  other  reasons  for  expecting a  negative relationship
between multilateral flows and private capital flows to developing countries (although not all of
them would imply "crowding-out" of the latter by the former). Private flows may be discouraged
if multilateral lending programns  somehow created incentives for borrowing governments to delay
reforms necessary for growth and poverty reduction (Easterly 2000, Svensson 2000). Multilateral
lending may be "fungible" in the sense that it may enable governments to undertake low-quality
projects or programs (Devarajan and Swaroop 2000), or such loans may be used for servicing old
debt,  thus  reducing the  "additionality"  of such  lending (Ratha  2001,  Birdsall  et  al.  2001,
Devarajan et al. 1999).3
In  the  context  of this  debate,  this  paper  examines the  trends  in  private  flows and
multilateral flows to  developing countries, using  data from  1970 to  1998, to  first  establish
whether there is indeed a  negative or counter-cyclical relationship between these flows; and
second, to show that even when some degree of counter-cyclicality existed, that need not imply
"crowding-out" of private flows to developing countries. Indeed short-term counter-cyclicality
and medium-term complementarity between multilateral flows and private flows to developing
countries can co-exist. The argument runs as follows: Let us assume that both multilateral and
private flows consist of two components-one  responsive to structural, policy and institutional
environment, and the other to cyclical factors (for example, an increase in GDP growth rate or an
interest rate hike in the industrial countries). Both private and official flows respond positively to
structural factors.  With respect to the cyclical variables, however, private flows tend to behave
3  Killick (1995b)  argued that nilitilateral lending may suffer from a moral hazard problem:  since the
preferred  creditor  status of the MDBs ensures that even ill-advised  loans get serviced  first, multilateral
lending  may  end up financing  low-quality  projects  or programs. Faini  et al. (1991)  also found  a negative
correlation  between  lending  by international  financial  institutions  and net private  credit. See also  Bird and
Rowlands  (1997).
4pro-cyclically whereas official flows are expected to react counter-cyclically. In addition, official
flows  may  (arguably)  lead  to  an  improvement  in  the  structural,  policy  and  institutional
environment of a country in the medium- to  long-run.  Thus, official flows would tend to be
counter-cyclical to private flows in the concurrent period; but these would tend to complement
private  flows  with  a  time  lag  by  signaling-and  often  fostering-a  better  investment
environment.
The main findings of this paper are:
*  Although private flows to  developing countries surged in the  1990s, multilateral
loans continue to be a significant source of external finance in most low-income and
lower middle-income countries. Even in the upper middle-income countries receiving
the  lion's  share of  private  flows, multilateral lending  has  played  an  important
stabilizing role during financial crises.
*  In recent years multilateral lending played a counter-cyclical or stabilizing role vis-a-
vis private flows as the demand for official borrowing rose during times of credit
rationing. Multilateral lending also complemented private flows with a time lag by
signaling-and  often fostering-a  better investment environment.
The rest of this  paper  is organized as  follows. The next section discusses  trends  in
multilateral flows vis-a-vis private flows to show that  multilateral flows remain an important
source of external finance in  many developing countries.  This section also  shows that  the
relationship between  multilateral flows  and  private  flows to  developing  countries  has  been
counter-cyclical in recent years, but it was not always so in the 1970s and early 1980s. Section 3
develops a simple framework for examining the cyclical and structural aspects of the relationship
between multilateral and private flows to developing countries.  Section 4  contains empirical
results. The concluding section summarizes the results and indicates areas of future research.
S2. Trends in multilateral and private flows to developing countries
The importance of multilateralflows
At their peak in 1996,  private flows to developing countries were more than ten times the
volume of official flows, and nearly II times that of multilateral flows. After a series of crises
since 1997, the difference between private flows and official flows has narrowed somewhat, but
there is no denying that private flows have surged ahead since the late 1980s (see figure 1, note
the difference between left and  right scales). 4 During  1997-98, private flows to  developing
countries stood at  12 times the size of multilateral flows (figure 2). However, private flows are
concentrated in only a few middle-income countries, 5 and multilateral flows remain an important
source of development finance in the majority of developing countries, especially in the low-
income countries (LICs) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 6
Multilateral loans accounted for about half of total official flows to developing countries
during 1997-98.  In fact, the share of multilateral flows in total official flows was higher in the
4  Unless  otherwise  specified,  data on capital flows are taken from World  Bank's Global Development
Finance  (GDF)  database,  and  IMF  flows  are treated  separately  from multilateral  flows.
5 For example,  as of September  2000  the number  of developing  countries  rated  by Standard  and  Poor's  was
52 out of a total  of 137  covered  in the Global  Development  Finance  (GDF)  (World  Banik  2000). Most of
the developing  countries  lhave  sub-investment  grade rating or are not rated at all by major  credit rating
agencies.
6 The  definitions  of income  groups  and regions  are taken  from World  Bank (2000).
6middle-income countries than in the low-income countries in this period as the rescue packages
for the Asian crises were financed mostly by multilateral lending from the IMF and the MDBs. 7
Counter-cyclicality between multilateral and privateflows to developing countries
Multilateral flows played a stabilizing role in response to the financial crises in the 1980s
and the 1990s (table 1). These crisis-related lending programs were specifically designed to boost
investor confidence through policy and structural reforms in the recipient countries (World Bank
1999). The historical trends shown in figure I reveal a remarkably negative or counter-cyclical
relationship between private flows and official flows in the  1980s and the  1990s.  Panel data
analysis of major middle-income countries also indicates a counter-cyclical relationship between
multilateral flows and private flows during this period (Dasgupta and Ratha 2000).
However, an examination of the  1970s does not reveal any  strong counter-cyclicality
between private and official flows.  Indeed, further disaggregation of data reveals that a counter-
cyclical relationship between non-concessional multilateral flows (i.e.,  multilateral lending to
middle-income countries) and private flows did not begin until the onset of the 1980s' debt crisis
(and, interestingly, the introduction of adjustment lending in the World Bank) (figure 3).
As mentioned earlier,  such counter-cyclical relationship observed in recent  years has
been interpreted by  some studies as evidence that  multilateral flows either did not affect, or
discouraged private flows. However, this relationship evident from the macro data does not take
into account the effects of relevant variables such as the income level, market access, growth
7The  International  Bank  for Reconstruction  and Development  (IBRD)  is by far the largest  source  of non-
concessional  lending  to developing  countries.  Gross disbursements  from the IBRD formed over lhalf  of
sucli  flows from all MDBs in 1999. The next largest sources  of non-concessional  funding  are the Inter-
American  Development  Bank  (IDB)  and the Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB). The  International  Monetary
Fund  (IMF)  does  not extend  long-tenn  loans  for development  purposes.
7performance, and population size. It also does not distinguish between short-term cyclical and
long-term structural relationships between multilateral and private flows.  A simple framework to
account for these factors and related results from multivariate regressions is presented in the next
two sections.
3. A  simple framework of counter-cyclicality and complementarity between multilateral
flows and private capital flows to developing countries
Both private capital flows and multilateral lending may be thought of as consisting of two
components-one  responsive to structural, policy and institutional environment in the recipient
country, and the other to cyclical factors  (for example, an increase in GDP growth rate in the
recipient country  or  an  interest  rate  hike  in  the  industrial countries). 8 Both  private  and
multilateral flows are expected to respond positively to the former set of factors.9 With respect to
cyclical variables,  however,  private  flows  may  respond  pro-cyclically whereas  multilateral
lending is expected to react counter-cyclically. Thus, we postulate:
P =mI,+nCE  (1)
MI  aI,  - bCt  (2)
8 See  Dadush, Dasgupta  and Ratha (2000)  for an outline  of cyclical,  structural  factors,  also classified  as
"pull"  and "push"  factors,  which  affect  private  flows  to developing  countries. Although  this table refers  to
short-term  flows,  it is also  applicable  for longer-term  flows.
9 Although  not essential  to the results presented later, the assumption  that  multilateral  flows respond
positively  to structural  and institutional  factors is supported  by some recent studies. See for example,
World  Bank  (2000),  Burmside  and Dollar  (1997).
8where P 1 indicates private capital flows and M, indicates multilateral lending to a developing
country at time t.  I  stands for country policy and institutional performance while C' stands for
cyclical factors.  The coefficients a, b, m and n are assumed to be strictly positive.
Additionally, multilateral lending may lead to an improvement in policy and institutions
over time, which would imply an equation of the type:
It = constant + dMt,  (3)
Manipulating (1) and (2) yields:
P=  (-n/b)Mt + (an/b  +m)lt  (4)
Mt= (-b/n)P 1 + (a+bm/n)lt  (5)
Equations (4) and  (5) imply an inverse relationship between private capital flows and
multilateral lending.  These equations also imply a  positive relationship between private flows
and the policy and institutional performance indicator.
Using (3) in (4) yields:
P  = co  -c,MI +  c2MA,  (6)
where the co,  c],  c  C3  are positive coefficients.  This equation (6) implies a negative (counter-
cyclical) relationship between private capital flows and multilateral lending contemporaneously,
but a positive (or complementary) relationship with lags.
4. Empirical  results
The postulated relationship between private capital flows and multilateral lending can be
readily tested by estimating c, and c2 in equation (6).  For this purpose, we have used a framework
similar to R.odrik (1995). A panel data set was constructed for all  137 developing countries for
which  World  Bank  (2000)  reported  capital  flows  during  1970-98.  Period  averages  were
constructed from annual data for 1970-75, 1976-81, 1982-87, 1988-93  and 1994-98. Private flows
(PRIV) to a  developing country i was then regressed against multilateral loans (MUL7),  IMF
9loans (IMF), bilateral loans and grants (BILA), each variable with and without one period lag.
Thus, the regressions were of the type
PR'Vj,= YjAiX +b*Xit+c*M(JLTit+d*MUL  Tit  ,+f*IAFiF+g*  it-,
+ h*BILAit+j*BIIAi ,+ k*GRANIt+ 1*GR4NTit,+ei  (7)
where Ai, is a vector of period-specific and country-specific dummies (fixed effects), Xi, is vector
of control variables including log of population size, log of per capita GNP, GDP growth rate;
and ei,  is error term.  The subscripts i and t refer respectively to country and time period.  10
A practical problem in estimating this equation (6) relates to the scale effect arising from
the fact that large countries receive large amounts of both private and official flows.  This can
give rise to potentially misleading correlation between private and official flows.  To account for
this effect, we have reported two sets of results:  In the first set of results reported in table 2, we
have normalized capital flows by the GDP of the recipient country.  In the second, we have used
the share of flows received by country i in total flows to all developing countries-for  example,
the country share in private flows to developing countries is regressed against the country's shares
in respectively multilateral flows, IMF flows, bilateral flows and grants (table 3).  In this case, we
control for the size effect by including the (log of) population size as an independent variable."
(Using the  share of flows appears more appropriate in this  context for the following
reasons. Official lenders are often constrained from increasing lending volumes, thus increasing
the portfolio share may be the only way to send a positive signal about a country. A higher share
'° Note that this fonnulation  induces (negative)  serial correlation  in the error term.  For example,  an
unexpected  increase  in private  flows in period t would imply a decline  in the demand  for multilateral
lending according  to (5).  But that in the subsequent  period  may cause a weakening  in the structural,
institutional  and  policy  environment  (by  equation  (3))  and  a decline  in  private  flows (by  equation  (4')).
i' Another  variable  for nonnalizing  flows, used rather  less  frequently  in the literature,  is exports  (Bird and
Rowlanids  1997).
10of flows (even if the nominal dollar amount is small) may indicate a stronger commitment to the
country on  the part of the multilateral agency and hence a  stronger signaling value to private
investors. Priva,;e  investors also think of portfolio allocation (or country exposures) in terms of
shares rather than the size of the portfolio.  Finally, since private capital flows have surged in
nominal dollar tierms  in recent years whereas the size of official flows has remained more or less
unchanged, use of dollar values normalized by GNP would show a strong negative relationship
between official and private flows even if the portfolio allocation shares remained unchanged in
either cases.  However, a regression using portfolio shares is meaningful only for sub-groups of
countries (e.g., low income countries), but not meaningful for a panel consisting of all developing
countries since portfolio shares cannot increase (or decrease) in all countries at the same time.)
The regressions where flows are normalized by  GDP are  similar to those reported in
Rodrik (1995) except for the different  lag specification.  The results  reported in table 2 are,
however, qualitatively different from those in Rodrik (1995)12 The first regression in which only
current values of multilateral flows are used yields negative coefficients for multilateral flows and
IMF flows, underscoring their counter-cyclical behavior vis-a-vis private flows. Regression (2),
12 There are several differences  between the regressions  presented  in this section and those in Rodrik
(1995). Rodrik  used  net transfers,  whereas  we have  used  net resource  flows (which  is not netted  of interest
payments). Rodrik  combined  flows from MDBs  and the IMF;  but we treat them  separately. We also  use
concurrent  levels  of these  flows in addition  to lagged  values,  whereas  he uses only  lags. His regressions
included  the lagged dependent  variable on the right-hand  side, ours do not. Our country  grouping is
different  from his-for example,  our panel  includes  South  Korea  whereas  his panel  did not-reflecting new
grouping  used in GDF 2000. Also some data for the early 1990s have also been revised in this later
publication.  Nevertheless,  if we use the same  lag specification  as in Rodrik,  we  obtain  the saine  qualitative
results for  the period 1970-93. Thus, the  differences  in  qualitative results arise from the altered
specification  of the equation  as well  as the extension  of the sample  period  to 1998.
11however, reveals positive (though not significant) coefficients for the lagged multilateral flows.
The same regression for the  latest 1994-98 period (regression 3) variables yields statistically
significant coefficients for multilateral flows; and the coefficient is negative in the current period,
and  positive  for  the  lagged  variable,  indicating  concurrent  counter-cyclicality  but
complementarity after a lag of six years. Expectedly, the coefficients for per capita GNP and
GDP growth are positive and significant in explaining private flows.
Table 3 reports the regression results using portfolio shares, i.e., flows normalized by
total  flows in the  same category to  all  developing countries. (Population is  included as  an
explanatory variable to control for the size effect.  The sample period is 1994-98.) Three sets of
results are presented for lower middle-income countries, low-income countries, and low-income
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa respectively. These results indicate that multilateral flows had a
positive and significant impact on private flows with a one period (six-years in this case) lag in
lower middle-income  and low-income  developing countries.' 3 The results also indicate concurrent
counter-cyclicality (a  negative coefficient for  current multilateral flows)  in  the  low-income
countries.  14
The results are now more ambivalent regarding the effect of IMF and bilateral flows on
private  flows. IMF flows did not seem  to  affect  private flows to the  lower  middle-income
"  A somewhat  similar  findinig  from Dasgupta  anid  Ratha (2000) is that private  FDI and non-FDI  flows
relate  counter-cyclically  to IBRD  commitments  in the same  year,  but positively  to the IBRD commitments
with  a one year  lag.
1" The coefficient  for the current  multilateral  flow variable  is found  to be positive  (and not significant)  in
the  lower middle-income  countries, weakly indicating an  absence of  counter-cyclicality  between
multilateral  lending and private flows even in the concurrent  period. This result may mean that the
signaling  effect  on private  flows worked  faster than the six-year  lag assumed  here, or that the use of six-
year  averages  dampened  the cyclical  effects  on private  and official  flows.
12countries during 1994-98, but these flows had significant positive effects on private flows in low-
income countries, both with and without lags.  This is somewhat understandable because in IMF
loans tend to have shorter terms in middle-income countries than in low-income countries.5 In
contrast to mult.ilateral  flows which seem to affect private flows with a time lag, bilateral flows
(including grants)16  seem  to  have  a  significant and  positive  effect  on  private  flows in  the
concurrent period, but a negative effect with a lag.  This result may reflect the importance of
strategic and  non-economic considerations in aid  allocation by  bilateral  donors (Alesina and
Dollar 1998).
The marginal (medium-term) impact on  a country's  share in private flows when  its
share in multilateral  flows rises by one percentage point can be estimated from the coefficient d in
equation (7) above.  As can be seen from table 4, this marginal impact is smaller (0.12 percentage
points) in a low-income country in Sub-Saharan Africa than in a lower middle-income country
(0.989 percentage points).  However, a typical country in Sub-Saharan Africa received a much
smaller share of private flows-an  annual average of 0.032 percent compared to 0.997 percent in
a lower middle-income country during 1994-98.  Thus, when a Sub-Saharan country's share in
multilateral flows is increased by one percentage point, its share in private flows rises by 0.12
percentage points from 0.032 percent-a  nearly three times increase in private portfolio share,
and a significantly higher effect than in lower middle-income countries.
The results presented above should be treated with some caution.  It is important to bear
in mind that multilateral flows are  only one, and  perhaps not the best, among  a number  of
'5 Several  studies  reviewed  in Bird and Rowlands (1997),  including  their own empirical  investigation,
reported  that  the results  on the catalytic  effects  of IMF  flows  on private  flows  to developing  countries  were
inconclusive  if not negative.
16As  noted by many authors,  bilateral lending  has been replaced  by grants in recent  years, especially  in
low-income  countries  (Birdsall  et al. 2001).
13variables that  influence private capital flows to a developing country. Also, these regressions
suffer from negative serial correlation, although as mentioned earlier, this is to be expected owing
to the lead-lag relationship between private-official-private relationships postulated here. Finally,
whether  we  normalize  flows  by  GDP  or  by  total  flows  of the  relevant type  of capital to
developing countries seems to generate widely divergent results.
5.  Conclusion
Official flows in general, and multilateral flows in particular, are an important source of
external finance in the majority of developing countries, since private flows are received only by
a  handful of  middle-income countries. Both  private flows  and  multilateral lending  respond
positively to  structural, policy and  institutional environment in the recipient country.  With
respect to the cyclical factors (for example, an increase in GDP growth rate or an interest rate
hike in the industrial countries), however, private flows tend to behave pro-cyclically, whereas
official  flows  react  counter-cyclically.  In  addition,  multilateral  flows  may  lead  to  an
improvement in the structural, policy and institutional environment of a country in the medium-
run.  Thus,  although  multilateral  lending  may  be  counter-cyclical to  private  flows  in  the
concurrent period, it may complement private flows with a time lag by signaling-and  often
fostering-a  better investment environment.
It would be useful to distinguish the effects of multilateral flows on different types of
private flows such as FDI, portfolio flows and bank loans.'7 Preliminary results suggest the effect
is indeed positive in case of FDI and bonds, but not significant in the case of equity and bank
loans. More research is needed in this area.
7 See also  Rodrik  (1995),  and Bird and  Rowlands  (1997).
14The analysis above ignores the effects of the policy environment in the recipient country
as well as the external economic environment.  As has been noted in the literature, aid works
better in a good policy environment (Dollar and Bumside 1999, Collier and Dollar 1999).  We
have partially captured the effect of good policies through the growth and per capita income
variables, but an explicit treatment of policy performance would be useful.  Also our analysis
does not take into account the fact that the relationship between multilateral flows and private
flows may depend on what multilateral loans finance in the recipient country, and how these
loans are financed.' 8 If, for example, multilateral loans are used for debt service payments, the
impact on private flows may  be weakened (Ratha 2001, Easterly 2000). Again, for  example,
financing multilateral loans by borrowing from the domestic capital market in emerging market
economies may weaken the impact on private flows.
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18Figure 1: counter-cyclicality  between private non-FDI and official flows
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1  9Table 1: Official financing during recent crises
$ billion  Mexico  Indonesia, Korea, Thailand  Indonesia, Korea, Thailand
Change in flows between  Change in flows between  Clhange  in flows between 1997
1993 and 1995  1996  and 1997  and 1998
IMF  13.3  16.8  11.6
Multilateral  0.7  7.0  8.3
Bilateral nonconcessional  9.6  4.9  0.7
Total  10.3  11.9  10.3
(including granits not  slhown
above)
Source: Global Development  Finance, World Bank
20Table 2: Regression results using flows as a share of GDP, period average during  1994-1998
Dependent ivariable  is private tlows as a share of GI)P (PRIVg=PRlV, /GDP,), annual average during 1994-98.
All developing counitries,  All developing countries,  All developing countries,
includinig  only current  including both current anid including both current and
official flows  lagged official flows  lagged official flows
1976-98  1976-98  1994-98
(1)  (2)  (3)
MUALTg  -().051  -0.158  -1.007**
AMULTg,  lagged  ..  0.009  0.538**
LMFg  -0.104  -0.101  0.259
IMFg,  lagged  ..  0.543  1.489*
BILAg (incl.  grants)  0.043  -0.015  -0.137
BILAg  (incl.  grants), lagged  ..  0.122***  0.243***
Log(GNP  per capita)  0.654**  0.889***  0.798
CGROWTH  0.370***  0.475***  0.838***
Adjusted R
2 0.21  0.30  0.53
D.W.  0.95  0.91
No. of observations  394  358  106
No. of countries  128  110  106
These cross-country regressions use averages of variables for the periods 1970-75, 1976-81, 1982-87, 1988-93, and 1994-98 (as
applicable). Each variable is expressed as a share of countryGDP.  For example, MULTg  =AMZLT/GIDP  and so on.  A constant
term and dummnies  for severely-indebted low-income countries (SILIC), severely indebted middle-income countries (SIMIC),
moderately-indebted  low-income countries (MILIC) and moderately-indebted middle-income countries (MIMIC) as defined in GDF
2000, and also period dummies for 1982-87, 1988-93  and 1994-98  were also included in these regressions (as applicable), but not
shown here. tt**,  and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
21Table 3: Regression  results using portfolio shares,  period average  during  1994-1998
Dependent variable is share in private flows (PR!Vs=PRJVk/  PRI[V ), amnual  average during 1994-98.
Lower middle-inicome  Low-income  Low-income countries
countries  countries  in Sub-Saharan Africa
(1)  (2)  (3)
MULTs  0.155  -0.231***  -0.033
MULTs,  lagged  0.989***  0.375***  0.120**
IMFs  -0.01  7  0.060***  -0.022
.7MFs,  lagged  -0.007  0.007***  0.003*
BILAs (incL grants)  1.543***  0.288***  0.032
BILAs  (incl. grants), lagged  -0.867***  -0.274***  -0. 134**
Log(CGNP  per capita)  0.687  -0.023  0.023
GROWTH  0.047  0.006  0.002
Log(Population)  -0.086  -0.022  0.032
Adjusted R2 0.89  0.95  0.37
No. of observations  38  48  35
T  hese cross-country regressions use period averages of variables during 1994-98. Each variable is expressed as a
country'sshareintotal  flows.  For example, MU1LTs=MULTj/EJ1ULT1 , and so on.  Aconstanttermand  dummies
for SILIC, SIMIC, MILIC  and MIMIC as defined in GDF 2000 were also included in these regressions, but not shown
here. **,  ** and  * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%  levels respectively.
22Table 4: Impact on a country's share in private flows when its share in multilateral flows
increases by one percentage point
Average  lower  middle-  Average  low-income  country  in
income  country  Sub-Saharan  Africa
A. Marginal  impact  after six years*  0.989  0.120
B. Average  country  share  in annual  0.991  0.032
private  flows  during  1994-98
(C.  Overall  change  in country  share  in  99.7%  375%
private  flows  (A as %  of B)
* In this table,  the estimated  d coefficient  (corresponding  to lagged  MDB  flows  in Table  3) is shown  as the
marginal  impact.
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